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Abstract
Upstream reciprocity (also called generalized reciprocity) is a putative mechanism for cooperation in social dilemma
situations with which players help others when they are helped by somebody else. It is a type of indirect reciprocity.
Although upstream reciprocity is often observed in experiments, most theories suggest that it is operative only when
players form short cycles such as triangles, implying a small population size, or when it is combined with other mechanisms
that promote cooperation on their own. An expectation is that real social networks, which are known to be full of triangles
and other short cycles, may accommodate upstream reciprocity. In this study, I extend the upstream reciprocity game
proposed for a directed cycle by Boyd and Richerson to the case of general networks. The model is not evolutionary and
concerns the conditions under which the unanimity of cooperative players is a Nash equilibrium. I show that an abundance
of triangles or other short cycles in a network does little to promote upstream reciprocity. Cooperation is less likely for a
larger population size even if triangles are abundant in the network. In addition, in contrast to the results for evolutionary
social dilemma games on networks, scale-free networks lead to less cooperation than networks with a homogeneous
degree distribution.
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Introduction
Several mechanisms govern cooperation among individuals in
social dilemma situations such as the prisoner’s dilemma game.
Upstream reciprocity, also called generalized reciprocity, is one
such mechanism in which players help others when they
themselves are helped by other players. It is a form of indirect
reciprocity, in which individuals are helped by unknown others
and vice versa [1,2].
Cooperation based on upstream reciprocity has been observed
in various laboratory experiments. Examples include human
subjects in variants of the trust game, which is a social dilemma
game [3–5], human subjects participating in filling out tedious
surveys [6], and rats pulling a lever to deliver food to a conspecific
[7]. Even more experimental evidence is available in the field of
sociology in the context of social exchange [8,9] (also see [10,11]
for classical examples of the Kula ring).
Nevertheless, theory and numerical simulations have revealed
that upstream reciprocity in isolation does not promote cooper-
ation (but see Barta et al. [12] for an exception). Upstream
reciprocity usually supports cooperation only when combined with
another mechanism that can yield cooperation on its own.
Cooperation appears when the population size is small [13,14],
upstream reciprocity is combined with direct reciprocity or spatial
reciprocity [15], players move across groups [16], players interact
assortatively [17], or players inhabit heterogeneous networks [18].
In their seminal study, Boyd and Richerson analyzed an
upstream reciprocity game on a directed cycle and showed that it
yields cooperation only when the cycle is small [13]. The shortest
possible cycle with indirect reciprocity consists of three players
( Fig. 1) because a cycle composed of two players only involves
direct reciprocity. Cooperation is intuitively less likely for longer
cycles because a player that helps a unique downstream neighbor
on the cycle has to ‘‘trust’’ too many intermediary players for their
tendency to cooperate before the player eventually receives help.
Real social networks are full of short cycles represented by
triangles, a feature known as transitivity [19] or clustering [20–22].
Therefore, a natural expectation is that larger networks with a
high level of clustering (i.e., many triangles) may facilitate
cooperation based on upstream reciprocity [8]. In the present
study, I address this issue theoretically. I extend the model of Boyd
and Richerson [13] to general networks and derive the condition
under which the unanimity of players using upstream reciprocity is
resistant to invasion of defectors. Then, I apply the condition to
model networks to show that clustering does little to promote
cooperation except in an unrealistic network. This conclusion
holds true for both homogeneous and heterogeneous networks,
where heterogeneity concerns that in the degree, i.e., the number
of neighbors for a player.
My results seem to contradict previous results for spatial
reciprocity in which clustering enhances cooperation in the
prisoner’s dilemma game [23] and those for heterogeneous
networks in which heterogeneity enhances cooperation in various
two-person social dilemma games [24–27] and in the upstream
reciprocity game [18]. These previous models are evolutionary,
however, whereas mine and the original model by Boyd and
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equilibrium. I opted to use a nonevolutionary setting in this study
because interpretation of evolutionary games seems elusive for
heterogeneous networks [28,29] (see Discussion for a more
detailed explanation).
Results
Preliminary: upstream reciprocity on a directed cycle
Boyd and Richerson proposed a model of upstream reciprocity
on the directed cycle [13]. By analyzing the stability of a
unanimous population of cooperative players, they showed that
cooperation is unlikely unless the number of players, denoted by
N, is small.
In their model, the players are involved in a type of donation
game. Each player may donate to a unique downstream neighbor
on a directed cycle at time t~0 by paying cost c(w0). The
recipient of the donation gains benefit b(wc). Among the
recipients of the donation at t~0, those who comply with
upstream reciprocity donate to a unique downstream neighbor at
t~1 by paying cost c. Chains of donation are then carried over to
downstream players, who may donate to their downstream
neighbors at t~2.A tt~1, defectors that have received a
donation at t~0 terminate the chain of donation. Such defectors
receive benefit b at t~0 and lose nothing at t~1. This procedure
is repeated for all players until all the chains of donation terminate.
If all the players perfectly comply with upstream reciprocity, the
chains never terminate. In contrast, if there is at least one defector,
all the chains terminate in finite time.
As in iterated games [30,31], w (0ƒwv1) is the probability that
the next time step occurs. We can also interpret w as the
probability that players complying with upstream reciprocity do
donate to their downstream neighbors, such that they erroneously
defect with probability 1{w in each time step. Each player’s
payoff is defined as the discounted sum of the payoff over the time
horizon. In other words, the payoff obtained at time t (§0)
contributes to the summed payoff with weight wt.
It may be advantageous for a player not to donate to the
downstream neighbor to gain benefit b without paying cost c over
the time course. However, a player that complies with upstream
reciprocity may enjoy a large summed payoff if chains of donation
persist in the network for a long time.
Each player is assumed to be of either classical defector (CD;
termed unconditional defection in [13]) or generous cooperator
(GC; termed upstream tit-for-tat in [13]). By definition, a CD does
not donate to the downstream neighbor at t~0 and refuses to
relay the chain of donation received from the upstream neighbor
to the downstream neighbor at t§1. A GC donates at t~0 and
donates to the downstream neighbor if the GC received a donation
from the upstream neighbor in the previous time step.
For this model, Boyd and Richerson obtained the condition
under which the unanimity of GCs is robust against the invasion of
a CD (i.e., conversion of one GC into CD). When all players are
GC, the summed payoff to one GC is equal to
(b{c)(1zwzw2z...)~
b{c
1{w
: ð1Þ
If N{1 players are GC and one player is CD, the unique CD’s
summed payoff is given by
b(1zwzw2z...zwN{1)~
b(1{wN{1)
1{w
: ð2Þ
Therefore, GC is stable against the invasion of CD if the right-
hand side of Eq. (1) is larger than that of Eq. (2), that is,
wN{1w
c
b
: ð3Þ
Equation (3) generalizes the result for direct reciprocity [30,31],
which corresponds to the case where N~2. Equation (3) also
implies that cooperation is likely if w is large. However,
maintaining cooperation is increasingly difficult as N increases.
Model
I generalize the Boyd-Richerson model on a directed cycle to
the case of general networks. Consider a network of N players in
which links may be directed or weighted. I denote the weight of
the link from player i to j by Aij§0. I assume that the network is
strongly connected, i.e., any player is reacheable from any other
player along directed links. Otherwise, chains of donation starting
from some playes never return to them because of the purely
structural reason. In such a network, it would be more difficult to
maintain cooperation than in strongly connected networks. Even
for strongly connected networks that might accommodate
upstream reciprocity, I will show that cooperation is not likely
for realistic network structure.
Assume that all the players are GC and that each GC starts a
chain of donation of unit size at t~{?. Therefore, the total
amount of donation flowing in the network in each time step is
equal to N. In the steady state, the total amount of donation that
each player receives from upstream neighbors is equal to that each
player gives to downstream neighbors in each time step. I denote
the total amount of donation that reaches and leaves player i by
Nvi, where
PN
i~1 vi~1. In this situation, the amount of donation
that player i imparts to player j in each time step is equal to
NviAij=kout
i , where kout
i :
PN
‘~1 Ai‘ is the outdegree of player i.
Player i receives payoff (b{c)Nvi in each time step.
In our previous work [18], we assumed that each GC starts a
unit flow of donation at t~0. In the present study, however, I wait
until the flow reaches the steady state before starting the game at
t~0.
The definition of CD for general networks is straightforward; a
CD donates to nobody for t§0. I extend the concept of GC to the
case of general networks as follows. On a directed cycle, a GC
quits helping its downstream neighbor once the GC is not helped
by the upstream neighbor [13]. On a general network, the total
amount of donation that GC i receives per unit time in the
absence of a CD is equal to Nvi~
PN
‘~1 Nv‘A‘i=kout
‘ . If there is a
CD, the total amount of donation that GC i receives may be
smaller than the amount that player i would receive in the absence
of a CD. By definition, the GC responds to this situation by
relaying the total amount of the incoming donation proportionally
to all its downstream neighbors in accordance with the weights of
the links outgoing from player i.
Figure 1. Directed cycle with N~3 nodes.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0025190.g001
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denoted by j, is CD and all the other N{1 players, including
player i, are GC. At t~0, the total amount of donation that i
receives is equal to
PN
‘~1,‘=j Nv‘A‘i=kout
‘ , which is smaller than
Nvi. Player i donates Nvi in total. Therefore, player i’s payoff at
t~0 is equal to b
PN
‘~1,‘=j Nv‘A‘i=kout
‘ {cNvi. In response to the
amount of donation that player i received at t~0, player i adjusts
the total amount of donation that it gives the downstream
neighbors from Nvi to
PN
‘~1,‘=j Nv‘A‘i=kout
‘ at t~1. Therefore,
player i donates
PN
‘~1,‘=j (Nv‘A‘i=kout
‘ )|(Aij
0=kout
i ) to its down-
stream neighbor j
0
. This quantity is smaller than the donation that
player i would give player j
0
in the absence of CD j, which would
be equal to NviAij
0=kout
i .
An implicit assumption is that the GC cannot identify the
incoming links along which less donation is received as compared
to the case without a CD. In other words, even if a GC is defected
by the CD in the upstream, the GC cannot directly retaliate.
Instead, the GC distributes the retaliation equally (i.e., propor-
tionally to the weight of the link) to its downstream neighbors.
Stability of upstream reciprocity in networks
In this section, I derive the condition under which no player is
motivated to convert from GC to CD when all the players are
initially GC.
The steady state v~(v1 ... vN) is equivalent to the stationary
density of the simple random walk in discrete time. It is given as
the solution of
v~vD{1A, ð4Þ
where A~(Aij) is the N-by-N adjacency matrix, where Aij
represents the weight of the link from i to j, and the diagonal
matrix D is defined as D~diag(kout
1 ,...,kout
N ). The (i,j) element
of D{1A is equal to Aij=kout
i , that is, the probability that a walker
at node i transits to node j in one time step. If the network is
undirected, the solution of Eq. (4) is given by vi~ki=
PN
‘~1 k‘,
where ki~kout
i ~
PN
‘~1 Ai‘~
PN
‘~1 A‘i.
The summed payoff to player i is equal to
X ?
t~0
(b{c)wtNvi~
(b{c)Nvi
1{w
: ð5Þ
To examine the Nash stability of the unanimity of GC, I analyze
the situation in which player i is CD and the other N{1 players
are GC. At t~0, the N{1 GCs pay cNvj (j=i), and player i pays
nothing. Therefore, the benefits to the N players, including player
i,a tt~0 are given in vector form by
bNv(I{Ei)D{1A, ð6Þ
where I is the N-by-N identity matrix, and Ei is the N-by-N
matrix whose (i,i) element is equal to one and all the other
elements are equal to zero. The benefit to player j (1ƒjƒN)a t
t~0 is equal to the jth element of the row vector given by Eq. (6).
At t~1, the downstream neighbors of player i donate less
because player i defects at t~0. The amount of donation given to
player j, where j is not necessarily a neighbor of i,a tt~0 is equal
to the jth element of the row vector Nv(I{Ei)D{1A. Therefore,
the total amount that GC j(=i) donates to its downstream
neighbors at t~1 is equal to the jth element of Nv(I{Ei)D{1A.
Player i, who is CD, does not donate to others at t~1. Therefore,
the amount of the donation issued by the players at t~1 is
represented in vector form as Nv(I{Ei)D{1A(I{Ei). The
discounted benefits that the players receive at t~1 are given in
vector form by
wbNv (I{Ei)D{1A
   2
: ð7Þ
By repeating the same procedure, we can obtain the summed
benefits to the players in vector form as
bNv
X ?
t~0
wt(I{ Ei)D{1A
   tz1~bNv(I{Ei)D{1AI {w(I{Ei)D{1A
   {1
: ð8Þ
To derive Eq. (8), I used the fact that the spectral radius of
w(I{Ei)D{1A is smaller than unity (that of D{1A is equal to
unity). The ith element of Eq. (8) is equal to the summed payoff to
player i because player i does not pay the cost to donate at any t.
If the ith element of Eq. (8) is smaller than the quantity given by
Eq. (5), player i is not motivated to turn from GC to CD.
Therefore, the unanimity of GC is stable if and only if
bNv(I{Ei)D{1AI {w(I{Ei)D{1A
   {1
jiv
(b{c)Nvi
1{w
(1ƒiƒN), ð9Þ
where ji indicates the ith element of a vector. By rearranging terms
of Eq. (9), I obtain
vI{(I{Ei)D{1A
   :I{w(I{Ei)D{1A
   {1
jiw
c
b
vi (1ƒiƒN): ð10Þ
Because vD{1A~v, Eq. (10) can be reduced to
Ai1
ki
   
AiN
ki
  
I{w(I{Ei)D{1A
   {1
jiw
c
b
(1ƒiƒN): ð11Þ
Equation (11) is never satisfied when w~0 because Aii~0.I ti s
always satisfied when w&1 because the left-hand side of Eq. (10)
tends to vi as w?1.
For a directed cycle having N nodes, v~(1 ... 1)=N, kout
i ~1
(1ƒiƒN), and Aij is equal to 1 if (iz1)modN~j and 0
otherwise. Owing to the symmetry with respect to i, we only have
to consider the condition (i.e., Eq. (9) or Eq. (11)) for player 1 and
obtain the following:
v(I{Ei)D{1A~
1
N
(1 0 1 ... 1), ð12Þ
v (I{Ei)D{1A
   2
~
1
N
( 1001... 1), ð13Þ
v (I{Ei)D{1A
   N{1
~
1
N
(1 0 ... 0), ð14Þ
v (I{Ei)D{1A
   N
~(0 ... 0): ð15Þ
Therefore, Eq. (11) can be read as wN{1wc=b, which reproduces
the result by Boyd and Richerson [13].
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For general networks, calculating I{w(I{Ei)D{1A
   {1, which
is used in Eqs. (9) and (11), is technically difficult because this
matrix may have nondiagonal Jordan blocks. Standard formulae
for decomposing matrices under independence of different
eigenmodes do not simply apply. The method for efficiently
calculating I{w(I{Ei)D{1A
   {1 is described in the Methods
section.
I conducted numerical simulations for different networks to
determine the threshold value of w, denoted by wth, above which
the unanimity of GC is stable against invasion of CD. The
conclusions derived from the following numerical simulations are
summarized as follows: (a) abundance of triangles (and other short
cycles) hardly promotes cooperation, and (b) networks with
heterogeneous degree distributions yield less cooperation than
those with homogeneous degree distributions.
Network models. I use five types of undirected networks
generated from four network models. It would be even more
difficult to obtain cooperation in directed networks because
undirected networks generally allow more direct reciprocity than
directed networks (see Discussion for a more detailed explanation).
The regular random graph (RRG) is defined as a completely
randomly wired network under the restriction that all nodes (i.e.,
players) have the same degree k [21,22]. The RRG has low
clustering (i.e., low triangle density) and is homogeneous in degree
[21,22,32].
To construct a network from the Watts-Strogatz (WS) model
[32], nodes are placed in a circle and connected such that each
one is adjacent to the k=2 closest nodes on each side on the circle.
In this way, each node has degree k. A fraction p of the links is
then rewired, and a selected link preserves one of its end nodes and
abandons the other end node. Then, I randomly select a node
from the network as the new destination of the rewired link such
that self-loops and multiple links are avoided. I use two cases, one
in which p~0 and the other in which p is small but greater than
zero. In both cases, the network has a high amount of clustering.
When p~0, the network is homogeneous in degree and unrealistic
because it has a large average distance between nodes. When p is
positive and appropriately small, the degree is narrowly distributed
and the network has a small average distance [32].
As an example of networks with heterogeneous degree
distribution, I use the Baraba ´si-Albert (BA) model. It has a
power-law (scale-free) degree distribution p(k)!k{3, a small
average distance, and low level of clustering [20,33].
To probe the effect of triangles in scale-free networks, I use a
variant of the Klemm-Eguluz (KE) model [34,35]. For appropriate
parameter values, my variant of the KE model generates scale-free
networks with p(k)!k{3, small average distances, and a high
level of clustering.
The effect of clustering. For a fixed network and a fixed
value of cost-to-benefit ratio c=b, the threshold value of w above
which the unanimity of GC is stable against conversion of player i
into CD depends on i. I denote this value by wth(i). I determine
wth as the largest value of wth(i) (1ƒiƒN). This is true because
once a certain player i turns from GC to CD, other players may be
also inclined to turn to CD. It is straightforward to extend the
condition shown in Eq. (9) to the case of multiple CD players. For
example, we can similarly derive the condition under which player
j turns from GC to CD when player i (=j) is CD and all the other
N{2 players are GC. For example, on the left-hand side of Eq.
(9), we just need to replace Ei with EizEj. I confirmed for all the
following numerical results that once a player turns from GC to
CD, some others are also elicited to turn from GC to CD
according to the Nash criterion and that such a transition from
GC to CD cascades until all players are CD. In loose terms, this
phenomenon is reminiscent of models of cascading failure of
overloaded networks, which mimic, for example, blackouts on
power grids [36].
The relationship between wth and c=b is shown in Fig. 2(a) for
the five networks with N~20 and mean degree k~4. The
parameter values for the networks are explained in the caption of
Fig. 2. A small c=b value results in a small wth value, indicating
that cooperation is facilitated. This is generally the case for various
mechanisms for cooperation [2,37].
For reference, the results for direct reciprocity (wth~c=b) and
upstream reciprocity on the directed triangle (Fig. 1; wth~
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
c=b
p
)
are also shown in Fig. 2(a) by thin black lines. Except for small c=b
Figure 2. Relationship between threshold discount factor (wth)
and cost-to-benefit ratio (c=b). I use the five types of networks and
set (a) N~20, k~4, and (b) N~200, k~6. The results for direct
reciprocity (i.e., wth~c=b) and upstream reciprocity on the directed
triangle (i.e., wth~
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
c=b
p
) are also shown by thin black lines for
comparison. In (a), I set the rewiring probability for the WS model to
p~0 and p~0:1. For the BA model, there are initially m0~2 nodes (i.e.,
dyad), and the number of links that each added node has is set to m~2.
For my variant of the KE model, the initial number of nodes and the
number of links that each added node has are set to m~2, and an
active node i is deactivated with probability proportional to (kiza)
{1,
where a~2. After constructing the network based on the original KE
model [34], I rewire fraction p~0:1 of randomly selected links to make
the average distance small. In (b), I set p~0 and p~0:05 for the WS
model, m0~m~3 for the BA model, and m~a~3 and p~0:05 for the
KE model.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0025190.g002
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compared to these reference cases.
The two networks generated from the WS model yield smaller
values of wth than those obtained from the RRG, indicating that
the WS model allows more cooperation than the RRG. Because
the degree distributions of these networks are almost the same and
the average distances of the RRG and the WS model with p~0:1
do not differ by much [32], I ascribe this difference to clustering.
An abundance of triangles and short cycles in networks (i.e., the
WS model) enhances cooperation. However, the difference in wth
is not very large. In quantitative terms, clustering does little to
promote cooperation.
The same conclusion is supported for heterogeneous networks
(the BA and KE models). Values of wth for the KE model, which
yields a high level of clustering are smaller than those for the BA
model, which yields a low level of clustering. However, the wth
values for the KE model are considerably larger than those for the
RRG and the WS model, and the differences between the results
for the BA and KE models are small.
To summarize, clustering promotes cooperation but only to a
small extent. To further substantiate this finding, I looked at
different cases. Figure 2(b) compares wth and c=b values for the
networks with N~200 and k~6. Figure 3(a) shows the
dependence of wth on N when c=b~1=3. These cases also suggest
that clustering hardly promotes cooperation.
Scale-free versus homogeneous networks. Figure 2
indicates that scale-free networks (i.e., the BA and KE models)
allow less cooperation than networks with a homogeneous degree
distribution (i.e., the RRG and WS model). This is in contrast with
the results for the evolutionary two-person social dilemma games
[24–27] and those for the evolutionary upstream reciprocity game
[18] on heterogeneous networks in which scale-free networks
promote cooperation. The difference stems from the fact that
players in evolutionary games mimic successful neighbors, whereas
in my Nash equilibrium model, players judge whether GC or CD
is more profitable when the other players do not change the
strategies (see Discussion for a more detailed explanation).
To probe the reason why cooperation is reduced on scale-free
networks, I examine the dependence of the player-wise threshold
value, i.e., wth(i) for player i, on node degree ki. I generate a single
network from each of the RRG, the BA model, and the KE model
with N~200 using the same parameter values as those used in
Fig. 2(b). For c=b~1=3, the relationship between wth(i) and ki is
shown in Fig. 4 for all nodes in the three networks. wth(i) decreases
with ki in the BA and KE models. In the RRG, ki is equal to 6 for
all the nodes, and the value of wth(i) is approximately the same for
all the nodes.
wth(i) and ki are negatively correlated because the amount of
donation flow that a putative CD i stops is strongly correlated with
vi.A tt~0, it is equal to vi.A tt§1, it is generally smaller than vi,
but player i having a large vi value tends to receive a large inflow
of donation, which player i stops in the next time step. For
undirected networks, vi~ki=
PN
‘~1 k‘!ki holds true. Players with
small degrees are therefore tempted to convert to CD because the
impact of the player’s behavior (i.e., to donate or not to donate) on
the entire network is small. Therefore, a small ki leads to a large
wth(i). Even for directed networks, vi and kout
i are often strongly
correlated [38–40]. Because the minimum degree in a scale-free
network is smaller than that in a homogeneous network if the
mean degree of the two networks is equal, scale-free networks have
larger wth as compared to homogeneous networks.
Cooperation in large networks. A comparison of Figs. 2(a)
and 2(b) suggests that a large N makes cooperation unlikely. To
examine this point further, I set c=b~1=3, generated 100
networks for each N value and each network type, calculated
wth, and obtained the mean and the standard deviation of wth.
Because the WS model with p~0 is unique for a given N, the
mean and standard deviation are not relevant in this network.
The mean and standard deviation of wth for the five networks of
various sizes are shown in Fig. 3(a). The results for the BA and KE
models heavily overlap. Cooperation is less likely as N increases in
all models, except for the WS model with p~0. This result is
consistent with that for a directed cycle [13].
wth increases with N not entirely owing to the decreased level
of clustering in the network. To show this, I plot the mean
and standard deviation of the clustering coefficient C([½0,1 ),
which quantifies the abundance of triangles in a network [32], in
Fig. 3(b). The clustering coefficient is defined as C:(1=N)| PN
i~1 (number of triangles including node i)=½ki(ki{1)=2 .
Figure 3(b) indicates that C decreases with N for the RRG and the
BA model. Therefore, the effect of N and C on wth may be mixed
in these two network models. However, C stays almost constant
Figure 3. Effects of network size (N). (a) Dependence of the
threshold discount factor (wth)o nN. (b) Dependence of the clustering
coefficient (C)o nN. I use the five types of networks and set c=b~1=3.
The parameter values for the networks are the same as those used in
Fig. 2(b). In (a), the results for the BA and KE models heavily overlap.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0025190.g003
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in wth is considered to originate primarily from an increase in N,
not from changes in the level of clustering.
In Fig. 3(a), wth seems to approach unity as N increases except
for the WS model with p~0. As previously stated, the WS model
with p~0 is unrealistic because it has a large average distance
between pairs of nodes [20–22,32]. Therefore, I conclude that
cooperation based on upstream reciprocity is not likely for
homogeneous and heterogeneous networks in general.
Discussion
I generalized the upstream reciprocity model proposed for a
directed cycle [13] to general networks and reached two primary
conclusions.
First, cooperation based on upstream reciprocity is not likely in
general networks regardless of the abundance of triangles and
heterogeneity in the node degree. Because the networks that I
examined are undirected, some amount of direct reciprocity is
relevant; GC neighbors partially retaliate directly against a CD.
My result that cooperation is unlikely for undirected networks
implies that cooperation would be even more difficult for directed
networks in which direct reciprocity is less available. In directed
networks, direct reciprocity occurs only on reciprocal links
between a pair of players.
Second, I showed that scale-free network models allow less
cooperation (i.e., large wth) as compared to networks with
homogeneous degree distributions. This result is opposite of those
for two-person social dilemma games [24–27] and the upstream
reciprocity game [18]. The difference stems from the fact that the
previous studies assumed evolutionary games and the present
study (and the original model by Boyd and Richerson [13]) is
based on nonevolutionary analysis.
I adopted a nonevolutionary setup and examined the condition
for the Nash equilibrium because the concept of the evolutionary
game on heterogeneous networks seems elusive. Evolutionary
games on heterogeneous networks imply that a player imitates the
strategy of a successful neighbor that is likely to have a different
node degree. However, players with different degrees are
involved in essentially different games because the number of
times that each player plays the game per generation necessarily
depends on the degree. Therefore, for example, a small-degree
player cannot generally expect a large payoff by mimicking a
successful neighbor with a large degree. In this situation, defining
the game and payoff for players with various degrees is compli-
cated [26,28,29]. Use of the Nash criterion does not incur this
type of problem.
The overall conclusions of the present study are negative. To
explain the occurrence of upstream reciprocity in real societies, it
may be advantageous to combine upstream reciprocity with other
non-network mechanisms, such as the ones mentioned in the
Introduction.
Methods
Numerical methods for calculating Eqs. (9) and (11)
I determined wth by applying the bisection method to Eq. (9) or
(11). To calculate I{w(I{Ei)D{1A
   {1 for different values of
w, it is beneficial to use the expansion of (I{Ei)D{1A in terms of
independent modes. This is possible when the adjacency matrix A
for the subnetwork composed of the GCs is diagonalizable, as
shown below.
I assume that there are Ns:N{Nd GCs and Nd CDs. In the
main text, I focused on the case Nd~1. However, the case Nd§2
is also relevant because I verified in the main text that the
appearance of a single CD leads to the further emergence of CDs.
Without loss of generality, I assume that players 1, 2, …, Ns are
GC and players Nsz1, Nsz2, ..., N are CD, and that the
network is strongly connected. We need to identify all the
(generalized) eigenmodes of EsD{1A, where
Es:
X Ns
i~1
Ei: ð16Þ
I first partition Es, D{1, and A into two-by-two blocks, each
partition corresponding to the set of GC and that of CD. For a
candidate of a left eigenvector of EsD{1A, denoted by v(i),
v(i)EsD{1A: v(i)
s v
(i)
d
   INs O
OO
 !
D{1
s O
OD {1
d
 !
Ass Asd
Ads Add
 !
~ v(i)
s D{1
s Ass v(i)
s D{1
s Asd
  
,
ð17Þ
where INs is the identity matrix of size Ns; Ds and Dd are
diagonal matrices whose diagonal entries are equal to the
outdegrees of the GCs and CDs, respectively; Ass is the Ns-by-
Ns matrix corresponding to the adjacent matrix within the GCs;
and Asd, Ads,a n dAdd are similarly defined blocks of the original
adjacency matrix A. Note that Ads and Add are absent on the
right-hand side of Eq. (17) and as such are not relevant to the
following discussion.
First of all, v(i)~(v(i)
s v
(i)
d )~eT
i (Nsz1ƒiƒN) is a trivial zero
left eigenvector of EsD{1A. Here, T denotes transpose, and ei is
the unit column vector in which the ith element is equal to unity
and all the other elements are equal to zero.
To obtain the other Ns generalized eigenmodes of EsD{1A,I
consider the case in which D{1
s Ass is diagonalizable. Otherwise,
efficiently calculating I{wEsD{1A
   {1 via matrix decomposi-
tion is difficult. D{1
s Ass is diagonalizable if the network is
undirected. A diagonalizable D{1
s Ass possesses Ns nondegenerate
left eigenvector v(i)
s (1ƒiƒNs) with the corresponding eigenvalue
li. It is possible that li~lj for i=j.
 
Figure 4. Relationship between threshold discount factor
(wth(i)) and node degree (ki). I use the RRG, the BA model, and
the KE model with N~200 and k~6, and set c=b~1=3. The parameter
values for the networks are the same as those used in Fig. 2(b).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0025190.g004
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left eigenvector is given by v(i)~(v(i)
s v
(i)
d ), where
v
(i)
d ~
v(i)
s D{1
s Asd
li
: ð18Þ
If li~0, Eq. (17) implies that v(i)~(v(i)
s v
(i)
d ) is not a left
eigenvector of EsD{1A. An example network with N~3 that has
nontrivial zero eigenvalues is presented in the next section for a
pedagogical purpose. When li~0, I set v
(i)
d ~0 such that
v(i)EsD{1A~( 0 |{z}
Ns zeros
v(i)
s D{1
d Asd |ﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ{zﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ}
of size Nd
): ð19Þ
Because (0 v(i)
s D{1
d Asd) can be represented as a linear sum of eT
i
(Nsz1ƒiƒN), v(i) is a type of generalized eigenvector corre-
sponding to li~0.
I denote by u(i) (1ƒiƒNs) the nontrivial generalized right
eigenmodes of EsD{1A corresponding to v(i). To obtain u(i),I
denote by u(i)
s (1ƒiƒNs) the normalized right eigenvectors of
D{1
s Ass with eigenvalue li. Then,
u(i):
u(i)
s
0
 !
gsize Ns
gNd zeros
(1ƒiƒNs) ð20Þ
are right eigenvectors of EsD{1A that respect the orthogonality
v(i)u(j)~dij, where d is the Kronecker delta.
For completeness, I obtain the expression of the other Nd right
eigenvectors of EsD{1A corresponding to the trivial zero
eigenvalue as follows. I align v(i) and u(i) (1ƒiƒNs) such that
nonzero eigenvectors correspond to 1ƒiƒNs{N0 and general-
ized zero eigenmodes correspond to Ns{N0z1ƒiƒNs. Then,
the orthogonality condition v(i)u(j)~dij reads
v(1)
s
v(1)
s D{1
s Asd
l1
. .
. . .
.
v
(Ns{N0)
s
v
(Ns{N0)
s D{1
s Asd
lNs{N0
v
(Ns{N0z1)
s
. .
.
0
v(Ns)
s
0 INd
0
B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B @
1
C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C A
u(1)
s u(2)
s    u(Ns)
s M
0 INd
 !
~I ð21Þ
for an Ns-by-Nd matrix M. Equation (21) yields
M~{ u(1)
s     u
(Ns{N0)
s
  
v(1)
s D{1
s Asd
l1
. .
.
v
(Ns{N0)
s D{1
s Asd
lNs{N0
0
B B B B B B B @
1
C C C C C C C A
: ð22Þ
Finally, the decomposition of EsD{1A is given by
EsD{1A
~
u(1)
s u(2)
s    u(Ns)
s M
0 INd
 !
l1v(1)
s v(1)
s D{1
s Asd
. .
. . .
.
lNs{N0v
(Ns{N0)
s v
(Ns{N0)
s D{1
s Asd
v
(Ns{N0z1)
s D{1
s Asd
0 . .
.
v(Ns)
s D{1
s Asd
00
0
B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B @
1
C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C A
~
X Ns{N0
j~1
lj
u(j)
s
0
 !
v(j)
s
v(j)
s D{1
s Asd
lj
  
z
X Ns
j~Ns{N0z1
u(j)
s
0
 !
0 v(j)
s D{1
s Asd
  
:
ð23Þ
Combining Eq. (23) and the orthogonality condition v(i)
s u(j)
s ~dij,
I obtain
EsD{1A
   ‘
~
X Ns{N0
j~1
l
‘
j
u(j)
s
0
 !
v(j)
s
v(j)
s D{1
s Asd
lj
  
(‘§2): ð24Þ
Using Eqs. (16), (23), and (24), we can express the quantities
appearing on the left-hand sides of Eqs. (9) and (11) as
I{w(I{Ei)D{1A
   {1
~Iz
X Ns{N0
j~1
wlj
1{wlj
u(j)
s
0
 !
v(j)
s
v(j)
s D{1
s Asd
lj
  
zw
X Ns
j~Ns{N0z1
u(j)
s
0
 !
0 v(j)
s D{1
s Asd
  
,
ð25Þ
(I{ Ei)D{ 1 AI { w(I{ Ei)D{ 1 A
   { 1
~
X Ns{ N0
j~1
lj
1 { wlj
u(j)
s
0
 !
v(j)
s
v(j)
s D{1
s Asd
lj
  
z
X Ns
j~Ns{N0z1
u(j)
s
0
 !
0 v(j)
s D{1
s Asd
  
:
ð26Þ
If Ass is symmetric, D
{1=2
s AssD
{1=2
s is also symmetric and
therefore diagonalizable by a unitary matrix. Denote the
eigenvalue and the right eigenvector of D
{1=2
s AssD
{1=2
s by ^ l li
and ^ u u(i), respectively. Note that ^ l li and ^ u u(i) are both real and can be
computed relatively easily. Then, we can obtain the relationships
li~^ l li, u(i)
s ~D
{1=2
s ^ u u(i), and v(i)
s ~^ u u(i)TD
1=2
s . We can also obtain
vd~^ u u(i)TD
{1=2
s Asr=li when li=0.
Example network yielding nontrivial zero eigenmodes
Consider the undirected network having N~3 nodes as shown
in Fig. 5. For this network I obtain
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001
001
1
2
1
2
0
0
B B @
1
C C A: ð27Þ
By turning player 3 from GC to CD, I obtain
(I{E3)D{1A~(E1zE2)D{1A~
001
001
000
0
B @
1
C A: ð28Þ
All of the eigenvalues of matrix (28) are equal to zero, one trivial
and two nontrivial. The one trivial zero eigenvalue originates from
removing player 3 from the network of GCs. The trivial zero left
eigenvector is given by v3~eT
3~(0 0 1). I select the two
generalized zero left eigenmodes to be vi~eT
i (i~1,2). The choice
of v1 and v2 is not unique. The right eigenmodes are given by
ui~ei(1ƒiƒ3).
Equation (19), for example, then reads v1(E1zE2)D{1A~
v2(E1zE2)D{1A~v3 and v3(E1zE2)D{1A~0.
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